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Chapter pages in book: (p. 46 - 51)in part the result of a difference in expectations. Government ex-
penditures and expenditures for producer durables and construc-
tion all increased more rapidly in percentage terms between the
second quarter. of. 1940 and the first quarter of 1941 than in the
corresponding period of 1950—1951, even before correction for
price changes. It is of course true that a large volume of unutilized
resources existed in 1940, so that defense and related expenditures
could be increased without pressing seriously on the volume of
resources available for the production of consumer goods. On the
other hand, the boomlet of 1939 proves that underemployment
is no guarantee against short-period inflation promoted by active
inventory speculation. In fact, had consumers acted in 1939 as
they did in 1950, the boomlet would probably have carried higher
and lasted longer, despite the fact that no defense mobilization was
undertaken at that time. Furthermore, the preceding discussion
has made it clear that resources wereavailablefor the production
of civilian goods in 1950. The violent rise in prices in 1950 must
be attributed to the inventory speculation of consumers and busi-
nessmen rather than to government competition for resources.
TheRole of Consumer Saving in 1941 and 1951
Thelull in consumer spending which followed the second buying
wave of the Korean period was reflected in a sharp rise in the ratio
of personal saving to disposable income (Chart 20). During the
inflationary phase of the expansion the saving ratio had fluctuated
violently with each change of expectations, and it stood at a low
level in early 1951 as a result of the heavy buying of January and
February. The ratio then increased sharply in the second quarter
and remained at a high level through the rest of the year, averaging
8.8 per cent in the last three quarters, as compared with 3.6 per
cent in the first quarter.
In view of the important stabilizing role of personal saving in
1951, it is interesting to observe that the saving ratio was consider-
ably higher in 1941 (Chart 20). The ratio rose steadily from the
third quarter of 1940 to the fourth quarter of 1941. The successive
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CHART 20
RATIOOF PERSONAL SAVING TO DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME,
QUARTERLY, AND1949—1952
Source: 1939-1942, Notional Income $upp/ement, 195/, Survey of Current Business 1949-1952,
Survey of Current Business, July 1953. Rutios computed by author.
ratiosfor the four quarters of 1941 were 7.4, 8.8, 11.1, and 14.0.
Thus consumers saved larger percentages of their incomes in every
quarter of 1941 than in 1951, and yet in the earlier year inflation-
ary pressures were strong and in the later year they were weak.
These facts suggest that in interpreting the developments of 1941
and 1951, emphasis should be placed not on the amount of saving
but rather on the circumstances under which saving increased in
the two periods.
Disposable personal income rose rapidly in 1941, so that even
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1949 1950 1951 1952though consumers saved much larger percentages of their incomes
than in any prewar year covered by the data (Table 3), they in-
creased their expenditures on consumer goods and services (Chart
21), and real purchases of consumer goods rose substantially
TABLE 3
RATIO OF PERSONAL SAVING TO DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME,
IN CURRENT PRICES, 1929—1952
(billions of dollars)
Saving Ratio
Disposable Personal (per cent)
Year Personal Income Saving (3 ÷ 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1929 82.5 3.7 4.5
1930 73.7 2.9 3.9
1931 63.0 1.8 2.9
1932 47.8 —1.4 —2.9
1933 45.2 —1.2 —2.7
1934 51.6 —0.25 —0.5
1935 58.0 1.8 3.1
1936 66.1 3.6 5.4
1937 71.1 3.9 5.5
1938 65.5 0.95 1.5
1939 70.2 2.7 3.8
1940 75.7 3.7 4.9
1941 92.0 9.8 10.7
1942 116.7 25.6 21.9
1943 132.4 30.2 22.8
1944 147.0 35.4 24.1
1945 151.1 28.0 18.5
1946 158.9 12.0 7.6
1947 169.5 3.9 2.3
1948 188.4 10.5 5.6
1949 187.2 6.7 3.6
1950 205.8 11.3 5.5
1951 225.0 16.9 7.5
1952 235.0 16.9 7.2
Source: National Income Supplement, 1951, Survey of Current Business, Table 3;
Survey of Current Business, July 1953, Table 3.
48CHART 21
CONSUMER EXPENDITURES BY TYPE, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED QUARTERLY
TOTALS AT ANNUAL RATES, 1939—1942
Billions of dollars
Ratto scale
(Chart 1 1).25 There was no softening of consumer demand com-
parable to that of 1951, although retail sales and expenditures on
25 It takes time for consumers to adjust their expenditure habits to a change in in-
come.If disposable income is rising slowly, the adjustment can be made with little
difficulty, but if it is rising rapidly, the response of consumers will be delayed until
(Continued on page 50)
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Source: Notional income Supplement, 1951, Survey of Current Business.
1941 1942consumer durable goods fell off somewhat near the end of the year.
In 1941, then, the rapid growth of income induced substantial
increases in both consumption and saving. In 1951, on the other
hand, the reaction from the second buying wave produced an
absolute drop in consumer expenditures in the second quarter
and rather modest increases in the third and fourth quarters (Chart
5). A more rapid growth of disposable income would in all prob-
ability have induced a greater growth of consumer expenditures,
at least after the second quarter, since consumers could have more
easily satisfied their desires to rebuild their holdings of liquid
assets. As it was, consumers reduced their savings in both absolute,
and percentage terms in the fourth quarter of 1951 and more
sharply in 1952 (Charts 10 and 20).
A sharp decline in inventory investment followed the increase
in saving in 1951, because the increase in saving depressed con-
sumption and had been preceded by a period of abnormal sales
and expectations that had encouraged heavy 'buying by manufac-
turers and distributors. When retail sales declined, the resulting
decline of inventory investment moderated the growth of income
and expenditures and helped relieve the pressure on prices. Thus
the increase in the rate of personal saving had the effect it had
because it occurred when disposabl.e income was not growing rap-
idly, and because it represented a sharp reversal of the previous
trend.
In 1941, on the other hand, inventory investment was main-
tained at high rates throughout the year, in defense and nondefense
sectors alike (Charts 16 and 18), but stock-sales ratios did not in-
crease until the end of the year (Chart 17). The decline in retail
sales in September 26 and October was reflected in a pronounced
they have had time to become accustomed to the sudden increase in income. In gen-
era!, one would expect that the greater the rate of growth of income, the more im-
portant would be the lag in consumption, and the larger the saving ratio. Table 3
reveals that the increase of disposable income in 1941 was much greater than in any
preceding year covered by the data, and this would seem to account, in part at least,
[or the very large saving ratio of 1941.
26Thedecline was coincident with the imposition of consumer credit controls on
September 1. There is no evidence that the decline was forced by a shortage of goods;
retail inventories rose absolutely and relative to sales as sales declined 16 and
50increase in the ratio of stocks to sales on all market levels in the
last few months of the year, which suggests that the rise in inven-
tory investment in the fourth quarter may have been unplanned.
Perhaps a period of voluntary inventory disinvestment would have
followed had the United States not entered the war in December.
TheExpansion of 1940—1941: Government
Operations and Supply Bottlenecks
Afederal deficit existed in 1940, but it was partially offset by a
surplus on state and local government account.27 The federal def-
icit grew more rapidly than the state and local surplus in 1941, so
that the combined deficit increased sixfold. The quarterly figures
(Table 4) demonstrate that the combined deficit did not become
large until the last half, and particularly the last quarter, of 1941.
Nonetheless, the growing deficit was adding to the inflationary
pressure after the first quarter of the year, at the very time when
prices began their rapid climb.
The mobilization effort of 1940—1941 would probably have pro-
moted an increase in total spending even had federal expenditures
been financed by noninflationary means. Part of the 25 per cent
increase in real private investment during 1941 was the direct re-
sult of the mobilization program. Mobilization for war production
required an expansion of industrial facilities, not only in the arma-
ment industries, but in basic industries as well; iron and steel, non-
ferrous metals, and machine tools were the most important. About
half the fixed capital outlay in manufacturing in 1941 was in arms
17). The decline in sales may have been a reaction to forward buying by consumers,
but there is no evidence of extensive forward buying; retail sales merely rose propor-
tionally with personal income up to September.
27 The figures, in billions of dollars, are as follows:
1939 1940 1911 1942
Government deficit (+) or surplus (—) +1.87 +0.55 +3.49 +31.16
Federal +2.21 +1.41 +4.89 +32.95
State and local —0.35 —0,86 —1.40 —1.79
Source: National Income Supplement, 1951, Survey of Current Business, Table 5.
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